

## Blake Riley

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CONTACT INFORMATION	University of Illinois Department of Economics 214 David Kinley Hall 1407 W. Gregory Dr. Urbana, IL 61801	<a href="mailto:blake.j.riley@gmail.com">blake.j.riley@gmail.com</a> <a href="http://blakejriley.com">http://blakejriley.com</a>
EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, University of Illinois Advisor: Steven Williams	2009–2016 (expected)
	B.A. in Economics, B.S. in Mathematics, Arizona State University	2005–2009
FIELDS	Microeconomic theory, game theory, mechanism design, market design, mathematical and computational economics.	
RESEARCH PAPERS	<p><i>Mechanisms for Making Accurate Decisions in Biased Crowds</i> (job market paper)</p> <p>This paper studies procedures for identifying the true answer to a binary question using the opinions of potentially-biased individuals. It's common and natural to side with the majority opinion, but the majority may make the wrong choice when the agents are biased. Taking majority rule as a baseline, I study <i>peer-prediction decision rules</i>, which ask agents to predict the opinions of others in addition to providing their own. This extra information enables us to potentially recognize the correct answer even when the majority is wrong.</p> <p>I first show that peer-prediction rules cannot be more accurate than the majority when we require them to satisfy the same symmetry conditions as majority rule and to be incentive-compatible for agents who intend to push the final decision towards their own opinion. Realistically though, not all agents distort their information strategically. I provide a simple decision rule based on the median agent's prediction that matches majority rule when all agents are strategic and makes more accurate decisions than majority rule when some agents are honest.</p> <p><i>Minimum Truth Serums with Optional Predictions</i></p> <p>Properly designed rewards can give survey participants an extra incentive to tell the truth. Here I provide a reward scheme based on minimal assumptions relative to existing methods while also simplifying the amount of information collected from participants.</p> <p><i>Uncoordinated Matching Markets</i>, with Juan Fung (in progress)</p> <p>Starting with Gale and Shapley (1962), centralized systems for matching two groups of agents into stable pairs have been thoroughly studied. However, the baseline alternative of agents searching and proposing independently without any coordination has received comparatively little attention. Via simulation, we show typical matches "on the road to stability" tend to be more egalitarian.</p>	
AWARDS AND RECOGNITION	Summer Research Fellowship Future of Humanity Institute Thesis Proposal Award Department Fellowship National Merit Finalist Scholarship	2012–2014 2013 2009–2011 2005–2009

TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Economics 500: Microeconomic Theory I <i>Teaching Assistant</i>	Fall 2014–2015
	Graduate Student Math Camp <i>Instructor</i>	August-September 2014
	Economics 502: Microeconomic Theory II <i>Teaching Assistant</i>	Spring 2012–2015
	Economics 202: Economic Statistics <i>Teaching Assistant</i>	Fall 2013
	Economics 102: Microeconomic Principles <i>Instructor</i> <i>Teaching Assistant</i>	Fall 2011–2012 Spring 2011
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES	Presentations <i>ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content (peer-reviewed)</i>	June 2014
	<i>Conference on Economic Design</i>	July 2013
	<i>Communications Seminar, Coordinated Science Lab, UIUC (invited)</i>	April 2013
	<i>Missouri Valley Economic Association Conference</i>	October 2012
WORK EXPERIENCE	Joint Legislative Budget Committee, Phoenix, AZ <i>Staff Intern</i>	2007–2009
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Independently analyzed agency budget requests and legislation.</li> <li>– Assisted in modeling Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System enrollment and expenditures.</li> </ul>	
OTHER INFO	Programming Language Experience <i>R, Julia, Scala, Python, Java</i>	
	American Citizenship	